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Nadine Burgschweiger 
 
‘Towards a Vibrant Africa’: The beginning of a new era 
of Japanese-African partnership? 
 
 
ith shrinking debts burdens, increasing numbers of foreign direct in-
vestments and expanding economies, Africa is becoming an emerging 
player on the global stage. Consequently, investor’s perceptions are also im-
proving, and as global competition for natural resources is stepping up, more 
and more international actors are making inroads into the continent and inten-
sifying their diplomatic efforts to ensure access to resource-rich countries and 
growing consumer markets.1 Japan, however, has long been uninvolved in this 
development and can be considered as a late-comer on the continent. 
Historically, Japan’s relationship with Africa has been largely based on 
economic interests and has not been as deep as with other parts of the world. 
However, this situation seems to have changed over recent years. Tokyo has 
three essential motives for enhancing its role in Africa. First, since Japan re-
lies heavily on imports of natural resources, it needs to secure reliable exter-
nal supply of raw materials like crude oil and rare metals, of which the con-
tinent is a major provider. Second, the market potential of the continent’s 
fast-growing economies is catching the attention of Japanese multinational 
companies. Another motive behind Japan’s growing efforts is its desire to 
seek support for its bid to become a permanent member of the United Na-
tions Security Council, as African nations account for one-quarter of the U.N. 
membership (The Nikkei Weekly 2008a; Nihon Keizai Shinbun 2008a). 
Particularly in the wake of this year’s various initiatives concerning Af-
rican development, including the Fourth Tokyo International Conference on 
African Development (TICAD IV) in May and the G8 summit in July, many 
scholars claimed that there has been a shift in Japanese policy towards Africa. 
By shedding some light on recent developments in the fields of diplomacy as 
well as economic relations between Japan and African countries, this article 
aims to analyze if this has been actually the case. Special emphasis will be 
put on the geopolitical rivalry which is increasingly evident on the continent, 
and how Japan can respond to it. 
                                            
1 This shift is also visible in terms of gross bilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
provided by the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) coun-
tries to sub-Saharan Africa, which doubled from 2004 to 2006 in comparison to the level of 
1992-1994 (OECD 2008: 222). 
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Diplomacy 
Compared with those of Europe, the U.S., China and India, Japan’s political 
ties to the continent had been rather limited.2 With primarily economic rela-
tions dating back to the end of the 19th century, Japan has been perceived as 
relatively neutral, mainly because of its non-involvement in African colonial 
history, thus giving it a diplomatic edge over other industrialized countries. 
However, due to this fact, it lacks the experience European actors have with 
regard to the continent. As a consequence, Africa has long been a rather un-
known region for Japan (Takahashi 2008; Pohl 1998: 240-242). 
However, diplomatic and political relations have gradually gained im-
portance, since Japan has intensified efforts after the end of the Cold War to 
push its image as a development advisor and a supporter of a broader in-
volvement of African leaders in international politics. The Tokyo Interna-
tional Conference on African Development (TICAD) has become the main in-
stitution channeling those objections and Japan’s diplomatic ties with the 
continent (Donnelly 2008: 3). After the outcome of TICAD IV and the G8 
Toyako summit in 2008 are examined, the current situation of Japan’s Devel-
opment Assistance to Africa will be discussed within this section. 
Spurring African development: Japan as TICAD IV and G8 host in 2008 
Since the first TICAD was initiated in cooperation with the United Nations 
and the World Bank in 1993 – at a time when global interest in Africa 
touched bottom – the summit has grown into one of the world’s major insti-
tutions for the promotion of African development. Taking place every five 
years, the conference, with its core principles being South-South cooperation 
and African ownership, is designed to draw inspiration from East Asia’s de-
velopment experience as well as to reflect African leaders’ own priorities for 
development. With these goals in mind, the TICAD has been able to establish 
unique development strategies, and the number of participants has grown 
steadily, as shown in figure 1 (The Japan Times 2008a; Donnelly 2008: 3-4). 
Judging by the number of participants alone, TICAD IV, which was 
held from 28 to 30 May 2008, was a success: 51 of the 53 African countries 
were represented in Yokohama, 40 of them by their head of state. Represen-
tatives of 34 partner countries as well as 75 international and regional or-
ganizations were also among the nearly 3,000 people attending the confer-
ence (MOFA 2008c). But TICAD IV was not only the TICAD summit which 
                                            
2  This also holds true for security issues, though the Japanese government decided in Sep-
tember 2008 to dispatch two Ground Self-Defense Force officers to Sudan by October 2008 
in order to support UN peacekeeping operations by assisting in road construction and 
mine-removing (NNI 2008b). 
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has attracted the most international attention, it was also the one with the 
most substantial concessions the Japanese government has ever made to-
wards African countries. Given its own tight fiscal leverage at present, Ja-
pan’s offers seem to be even more generous, underlining the government’s 
firm commitment to intensifying its efforts to promote African development 
(NNI 2008a). 
 
Figure 1: Participation of African nations at TICAD I-IV 
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The outcome of TICAD IV was summarized in the ‘Yokohama Declaration’, 
subtitled ‘Towards a Vibrant Africa’. The Declaration confirms that many Afri-
can countries have undergone considerable improvement, as many of them 
have achieved increased political stability as well as impressive economic 
growth rates and amounts of foreign direct investment. Nevertheless, the docu-
ment also acknowledges that there are still serious challenges left to take up, 
among them; the most urgent poor infrastructure, continuing poverty and infec-
tious diseases. Moreover, the document pointed out the plan to promote tech-
nology transfer, particularly through closer Public-Private Partnerships. In or-
der to ensure regular monitoring of the implementation process, a threefold fol-
low-up mechanism was established at the conference, which includes annual 
progress reports of the participating countries (MOFA 2008a; Kyodo 2008). 
Along with the declaration, a separate ’Yokohama Action Plan’ was 
drafted, serving as a ’road map’ for the implementation of the suggested meas-
ures and goals. First of all, the Action Plan confirms the government’s an-
nouncement both that it will double its Official Development Assistance and its 
commitment to double private direct investment by 2012. Recognizing agricul-
ture as a ’major driving force for economic growth’, it also schedules measures 
to increase food production. To strengthen their own efforts to improve frame-
work conditions, African governments themselves committed to allocate at least 
10 per cent of their national budgetary resources to agriculture and rural devel-
opment over the next five years. Within the same period, Japan will support Af-
rican nations in expanding their irrigated cultivation area (MOFA 2008b). 
Moreover, in his address at the opening session of TICAD IV prime minister 
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Yasuo Fukuda pledged to respond to a sharp rise in global food prices by pro-
viding Africa with a significant portion of the government’s announced emer-
gency food assistance package to developing countries worth 100 million US 
dollars. He also expressed the aim to double the continent’s current rice produc-
tion to 28 million tons by 2018 (MOFA 2008d).3 To support African nations in 
achieving their U.N. Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) adopted in the 
year 2000, several other projects are being promoted, with special emphasis put 
on community development. The Japanese government pledged to build 1,000 
elementary and secondary schools and also plans to provide assistance to 
teacher training. Moreover, 100,000 health and medical workers are to be 
trained as well (MOFA 2008b; Kamiya/Hongo 2008: 2). The Yokohama Action 
Plan also addresses environmental issues like production and utilization of 
clean energy as well as careful and effective management of water resources 
(MOFA 2008b). 
As pledged at the end of the Yokohama Declaration, Prime Minister Fu-
kuda reflected the outcomes of the TICAD IV at the G8 summit hosted in 
Toyako (Hokkaido) from 7 to 9 July 2008 and sought active support for Afri-
can development. Additionally, an Outreach Working Lunch and a Working 
Session with leaders from Africa was organized. Recognizing that the major-
ity of African countries are having difficulty achieving their MDGs, the G8 
leaders stated the need to further increase assistance to Africa as well as to 
fulfill their commitment of providing 60 billion US dollars for health over 
five years made at the Heiligendamm Summit 2007, and to provide 100 mil-
lion mosquito nets to prevent the spread of malaria. Addressing the current 
food crisis, they proclaimed their intention to set up a G8 Experts Group. Fi-
nally, a new follow-up mechanism was established to observe the implemen-
tation of past commitments (MOFA 2008g). 
Development assistance 
Since the End of World War II, Official Development Assistance has become 
the Japanese government’s principal instrument to join the efforts of the in-
ternational community and to pursue its diplomatic interests. Japan’s ODA 
budget, on the other hand, was tightened cumulatively by 37.6 per cent with-
in the decade from 1997 to 2007, as shown in figure 2 (GRIPS Development 
Forum 2008: 19). Under the current 2009 government draft proposal, how-
                                            
3  To achieve that target, a special high-yielding rice breed called ‘NERICA (New Rice for 
Africa)’ has been introduced successfully, being thought of as contributing significantly to 
food security in sub-Saharan Africa. Nevertheless, it has to be taken into account that the 
majority (around 70 per cent) of the region’s population is living on maize, not on rice. Mo-
reover, a crop that is as water-consuming as rice is surely only the second-best option for 
most parts of the continent suffering from recurring drought periods. That is why critics 
call it a ‘misdirected way of aid’ (Iriyama 2008). 
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ever, 771.9 billion Yen (7.88 billion US dollars) are being considered as ODA 
budget, which would mark a 10 per cent increase from 2008 and the first ex-
pansion since 1999 (MOFA 2008 f.). 
Figure 2: Japan’s ODA General Account Budget 
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Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo) 2008 
 
Japan, which was the world’s largest donor state in terms of volume from 
1993 until 2000, has been replaced as leading donor by the U.S. and the Uni-
ted Kingdom. According to preliminary figures of the OECD, Japan’s ODA 
net disbursements ranked fifth behind Germany and France in 2007. If meas-
ured as a share of national income, Japan’s commitment to development as-
sistance seems to be even less ambitious. In 2006, it amounted to 0.25 per cent, 
which ranked 19th among OECD countries and is projected to further decline 
in 2007, even behind Portugal and Italy (OECD/DAC 2008). 
Nevertheless, Japan remains one of the largest aid donors within the 
global community. From 2003 to 2007, it provided an annual average of 
about 900 million US dollars to Africa, and furthermore pledged at TICAD 
IV to double this figure to 1.8 billion US dollars by 2012 (The Nikkei Weekly 
2008a; MOFA 2008b). While the fragmented decision-making process with 
regard to ODA met much criticism in the past, the consolidation of Japan’s 
aid system completed in October 2008 is expected to break ground for a more 
fluent, cost-saving and efficient allocation of disbursements, even though 
these are declining (Watanabe 2008:14; Nihon Keizai Shinbun 2008b). 
In fiscal 2006, a total sum of 2.6 billion US dollars of development assis-
tance was directed to Africa, which represented 34.2 per cent of Japan’s 
whole aid disbursements to the world (see figure 3). It was the first time that 
the bulk of the amount flowed to another continent than Asia, which had 
been traditionally the largest recipient of Japanese ODA before. Compared to 
its 2000 level, Africa’s share of Japan’s assistance increased substantially, by 
about 2.5 times until 2006, whereas Asia’s share decreased by 51.1 per cent 
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over the same period. However, it has to be taken into consideration that the 
figures of 2006 included debt relief amounting to around 2 billion US dollars. 
If seen from this perspective – excluding debt relief – Japan’s share of overall 
bilateral ODA going to Africa stood at a mere 11.6 per cent, whereas Asia 
still held the larger portion of 44.2 per cent (MOFA 2007). 
Figure 3: Share of Japanese ODA for selected regions 
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Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo) 2007 
Economic relations 
Although Japan’s ties with the African continent have traditionally been fo-
cused on economic interests, private investment activities in particular have 
not kept pace with the level of bilateral assistance. This is mainly attributed to 
local problems like political instability, poor infrastructure and difficulties in 
the field of human resources. Moreover, economic exchange has been confined 
to a few certain countries on the continent, such as South Africa. It has, however, 
been transformed into a more balanced relationship over the past few years. 
Within this section how these shifts have actually taken place in the 
field of trade and investment will be examined. 
Trade 
After declining gradually for many years, trade between Japan and Africa 
has continued to rise since its low point in 2001, although it has still not 
reached its highest level of 1981 (see figure 4). In 2007, trade volume in-
creased by 16.3 per cent from the previous year. Japanese exports to Africa 
doubled within the four years from 2003 to 2007 up to 11.6 billion US dollars, 
while imports from the continent reached a record high for the third con-
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secutive year, amounting to 14.8 billion US dollars. With the prices for im-
ports of raw materials from Africa rising gradually, Japan’s traditional trade 
surplus has been converted into a deficit since 2001. In 2007, it totaled nearly 
3.2 billion US dollars (JETRO 2008a). 
 
Figure 4: Trade between Japan and Africa 1979-2007 
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In fact, natural resources make up a large proportion of Japan’s imports from 
Africa. In 2006, crude oil and platinum were the principal import items, ac-
counting for 21 per cent and 8 per cent respectively of the 13.26 billion US dol-
lars worth of commodities shipped from the continent. The bulk of the im-
ported crude oil is exported from Sudan, Angola, and Nigeria, whereas rare 
metals like platinum, palladium or cobalt primarily needed in the automobile 
and high-tech industries come from South Africa, Uganda, and Zambia. South 
Africa alone accounts for nearly one half of Japan’s trade with Africa, followed 
by Sudan (11%), Egypt (8%), and Nigeria (5%) (MOF 2008; see also figure 5). 
Although raw materials play a dominant role in Japan’s trade portfo-
lio with African nations, other primary products are important as well. For 
example, 70 per cent of Japan’s octopus imports come from Morocco, and 60 
per cent of cocoa beans bound for the Japanese market are shipped from 
Ghana. Meanwhile, Japan exports mainly manufactured products to African 
markets. In 2006, automobiles were the principal export commodity, account-
ing for 24 per cent of the total, followed by other vessels (6%) and engines 
(4%) (The Japan Times 2008b). 
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Figure 5: Japan’s trade with Africa by major trading partners 2007 
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Overall, Africa still accounts for merely two per cent of Japan’s global trade. 
In theory, the fundamental differences in factor endowments of developing 
Africa and Japan as a matured economy may contribute to complementary 
trade relations that are likely to be sustainable in the near future. In reality, 
however, a balanced access to each other’s markets has still not been achieved. 
An urgent challenge for Japan would be, for example, to open up its market to 
a broad range of agricultural products from African countries. The Japanese 
government’s Development Initiative for Trade, which should provide free 
market access for goods from Least Developed Countries (LDCs),4 could be 
one crucial step in this direction (NNI 2008a; MOFA 2006). 
Foreign direct investment 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) from Japan to Africa still remains at a com-
paratively low level, but it has been expanding dynamically within the last 
two years. But although Japanese companies invested an all-time record sum 
                                            
4  The Development Initiative for Trade was first presented by Prime Minister Jun’ichirô 
Koizumi at the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference of the WTO in December 2005 and is 
aimed at providing LDCs’ comprehensive assistance to facilitate trade beyond mere liber-
alization. Important measures within the Initiative are the promotion of no tariffs and no 
quotas for goods originating from LDCs as well as the One Village One Product Campaign, 
which intends to promote local economies (MOFA 2006). 
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of 1.1 billion US dollars on the continent in 2007, up from 899 million US dol-
lars in 2006 and 25 million in 2005, this still accounted for a mere 1.5 per cent 
of the total Japanese investments made worldwide that year. In sum, Japan’s 
FDI stock in Africa reached 3.9 billion US dollars at the end of 2007 (JETRO 
2008a). Compared with the overall stock of foreign direct investment on the 
continent, which totaled around 547 billion US dollars at the end of the same 
year, this figure is still extremely low (UNCTAD 2008). 
Until 2005, most of Japanese FDI went to South Africa, which has also 
been traditionally the leading trading partner for Japan on the continent5. A 
large proportion of Japanese investments are still made in that country, espe-
cially within the automobile market, which is already as large as Thailand’s 
at around 700,000 cars sold per year (The Nikkei Weekly 2008b). However, the 
state of disproportionate investment activities in South Africa is changing 
gradually, as the country’s share of Japanese FDI in Africa has decreased 
over the last two years (JETRO 2008a, see figure 6), indicating investment 
projects’ destinations are much more diversified now.6 
 
Figure 6: Japan’s foreign direct investment to Africa and South Africa in particular 
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In general, Japanese business activities in Africa are mainly led by the mining 
and automobile industries. But, whereas European as well as US American 
firms have already established solid business networks within the African 
continent, only few Japanese companies enjoy sustainable profits there (ibid.). 
                                            
5  This close relationship grew particularly during the time of Apartheid, when other major 
developed countries strictly held to their embargo policies towards South Africa. Although 
this impartial situation has been altered due to pressure exerted by U.N. in the 1980s, it can 
be observed even today, meeting with much criticism (Pohl 1998: 241; Ampiah 2005: 100). 
6  Indeed, Japanese business activities, currently expanding to various parts of the conti-
nent, substantiate that theory (for various examples, see Terada 2008). 
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Risk factors like infectious diseases, social instability and poor infrastructure 
make Africa a difficult place for business. A lot of difficulties for foreign and 
African enterprises arise from numerous different regional trade agreements, 
which are like a ‘spaghetti bowl’ with overlapping regulations regarding cus-
toms administration and processing, and are thus an impediment to trade 
and investment. With eight customs unions, eight other regional initiatives, 
and each African nation being a member of at least four of the above men-
tioned treaties, cross-border transaction costs on the continent are compara-
tively high (Broadman 2008: 103). Another serious obstacle for business in 
Africa is posed by product piracy. Among others, Japanese companies often 
complain about sales-distorting counterfeit products, in particular manufac-
tured goods from China (The Nikkei Weekly 2008b). 
From June to September 2007, the Japan External Trade Organization 
(JETRO) carried out a survey among 112 Japan-based firms concerning their 
experiences on African markets. Asked about the main problems of doing 
business on the continent, the firms named the maintenance and implemen-
tation of rules and law top of their lists, regardless of which part of Africa 
they operated in. In second place they ranked human resources and employ-
ment issues, followed by political instability. Despite those difficulties, how-
ever, recent business results of Japanese companies in Africa generally show 
an upward trend. According to the survey, more than 60 per cent of them en-
joyed an improvement during the five years from 2002 to 2007, mainly due to 
an increase in domestic and overseas sales. As a key to success on African 
markets, they most often mentioned price competitiveness and investments in 
goods suitable to the respective market’s needs (JETRO 2008b). 
To support this positive development, Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda at 
the opening ceremony of TICAD IV pledged that Japan would dispatch Joint 
Missions to Africa, to promote trade and investment as well as Japanese re-
source diplomacy (MOFA 2008d). From the end of August to late September 
2008, three of those missions had been carried out7, each made up of 60 to 70 
leaders from economic and political circles, ministries and government-
related organizations. The Joint Missions were the first that Japan has sent to 
Africa involving both public and private sector leaders (MOFA 2008e). 
Heading for a new Japanese-African partnership? 
Although a considerable number of nations on the continent have improved 
their economic performance over recent years, many people in Africa are still 
                                            
7  The South Mission visited Botswana, Mozambique, Madagascar and South Africa, while 
the East Mission was directed to Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Tanzania. The third mission 
to Central and Western Africa went to Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal (MOFA 2008e). 
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suffering from poverty. Thus, African nations continue to be reliant upon for-
eign assistance for furthering their development (Have 2008). To a great ex-
tent thanks to its TICAD series, Japan has grown into one of the most active 
advocators for Africa in the world community. Nevertheless, developed 
countries’ conferences on African development have generally had the wide-
spread reputation for being merely ‘talk shops’ instead of formulating concrete 
policies – and TICAD was no exemption in this regard (Ampiah 2005:110). So 
what has changed with Japan’s hosting of TICAD IV in May and the G8 
Toyako Summit in July 2008? 
First, the coincidence of various conferences related to African devel-
opment organized or attended by the Japanese government8 in 2008 certainly 
increased the international public’s awareness of the continent’s relevancy 
within the global context as well as of its urgent problems, be they climate 
change, rising food prices or human security. Second, after years of talking, 
this year’s achievements are much more focused on action. The orientation of 
Japan’s assistance has also changed, as more emphasis is now put on trade, 
investment and infrastructure by means of an extended contribution of the 
private sector (Watanabe 2008: 11). 
The findings of this article support the proposition that Japan’s relations 
to African countries have undergone significant changes over recent years, 
especially in the field of diplomatic exchange as well as in trade and invest-
ment relations. This year’s conferences and initiatives accelerated this devel-
opment. The substantial commitments and financial support pledged by the 
Japanese government towards African leaders at TICAD IV reflect the ongoing 
increase of international competition on the continent. Japan is now forced to 
act if it does not want to be left behind other nations in ensuring access to Af-
rican resources and markets. 
But as Africa’s bargaining power is rising due to its economic success and 
its appeal for various international actors, it will not be easy for Japan to take 
the leader in supporting African development. Moreover, with its Official De-
velopment Assistance shrinking, Japan can hardly outpace countries like China 
with respect to financial aid on the continent. Nevertheless, a qualitative im-
provement of ODA planning and allocation is expected to be obtained with the 
completed redeployment of the Japanese foreign aid system, making it more 
efficient even though the overall quantity continues to decline. 
Notwithstanding their need for continued foreign development assis-
tance, the majority of African nations want new partnerships that take into 
account their own innovation systems and provide access to technology as 
                                            
8  Besides TICAD IV and G8 Toyako Summit, Japan also hosted the G8 Development Minis-
ter’s Meeting in April 2008 in Tokyo and participated in the FAO (Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the U.N.) conference on World Food Security in Rome in June 2008. 
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well as higher education (Have 2008). This is a chance that Japan should 
seize as a major industrialized country, being itself increasingly reliant on ex-
ternal resources and markets due to its declining population and a highly 
advanced standard of living. Though playing a rather tangential interna-
tional role in determining aid policy in history, the less assertive stance Japan 
has taken in relation to African countries contributed to gradually strengthen 
mutual trust, further deepened during the TICAD process (GRIPS Develop-
ment Forum 2008: 22). What Japan particularly can do for Africa is to bring 
in its experience as the first non-western economy that managed to become a 
leading industrial country, and to offer its know-how instead of trying to com-
pete with other donors on the continent. Being both a major global player in 
international organizations and less burdened with historical baggage, Japan 
is probably the only country capable of successfully arbitrating between Af-
rica and the other advanced economies, and of obtaining better international 
cooperation on African development (Takahashi 2008; Donnelly 2008: 2). 
For African governments, on the other hand, improving their own 
wealth distribution systems, regulating domestic competition and intellectual 
property rights as well as simultaneously spurring their respective infant in-
dustries will be major tasks over the years to come. 
References 
Ampiah, K. (2005): Japan and the development of Africa: A preliminary evaluation of 
the Tokyo International Conference on African Development. African Affairs 104 
(414): 97-115. 
Broadman, H. G. (2008): China and India go to Africa – new deals in the Developing 
World. Foreign Affairs 87 (2): 95-109. 
Donnelly, Elizabeth (2008): The Tokyo International Conference on African Develop-
ment: Something old, something new?. Chatham House Africa Programme Back-
ground Note AFP BN 1/08, 21 May 2008, online: http://www.chathamhouse. 
org.uk/research/africa/papers/view/-/id/623, accessed 23.06.2008 
GRIPS (National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies) Development Forum (2008): 
Diversity and complementarity in development aid: East Asian lessons for African 
growth, online: www.grips.ac.jp/forum-e/D&CinDA.htm, accessed 24.07.2008. 
Have, C. ten (2008): Africa recasts priorities ahead of G-8. The Nikkei Weekly, 09 June 2008, 
p. 27. 
Iriyama, A. (2008): What Japan should and could do for development aid to Africa. CEAC 
Commentary, Council on East Asian Community, 22 August 2008, online: http:// 
www.ceac.jp/e/commentary/080822.pdf, accessed 03.11.2008. 
JETRO (Japan External Trade Organization) (2008a): Japanese trade and investment statistics, 
online: http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/reports/statistics/, accessed 20.10.2008. 
A new era of Japanese-African partnership? 
 
427
JETRO (Japan External Trade Organization) (2008b): Zai-Afurika shinshutsu Nikkei kigyô jit-
tai chôsa [Survey of the actual situation of Japan-based enterprises advanced into Af-
rica], JETRO kaigai chôsa bu chûtô Afurika ka [JETRO Foreign Investigation Depart-
ment, Central and East Africa Devision], 22 May 2008, online: http://www. 
jetro.go.jp/world/africa/reports/05001522, accessed 20.10. 2008. 
Kamiya, S./Hongo, J. (2008): Africa awaits real action in TICAD wake. The Japan Times, 31 
May 2008, pp. 1-2. 
Kyodo News Service (2008): African leaders, donors set priorities at Japan forum. 30 May 
2008. 
MOF (Ministry of Finance) (2008): Trade statistics of Japan: Africa Year Data, online: 
http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/suii/html/time_e.htm, accessed 20.10.2008. 
MOFA (2006): ODA White Paper 2006: Facilitating trade and investment, online: 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2006/ODA2006/html/honpen/hp2020
20205.htm, accessed  21.10.2008. 
MOFA (2007): Japan’s official development assistance White Paper 2007: Japan’s Interna-
tional Cooperation, online: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2007/ 
ODA2007/html/honpen/index.htm, accessed 15.10.2008. 
MOFA (2008a): Yokohama Declaration – Towards a Vibrant Africa. May 30, 2008, Online: 
www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/ticad/ticad4/doc/declaration.pdf, accessed 23.06.2008. 
MOFA (2008b): Yokohama Action Plan. May 30, online: http://www.mofa.go.jp/re-
gion/africa/ticad/ticad4/doc/actoin.pdf, accessed 23.06.2008. 
MOFA (2008c): Summary by the Chair of TICAD IV. May 30, 2008, online: 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/ticad/ticad4/doc/summary.pdf, accessed 
06.10.2008. 
MOFA (2008d): Address by H.E. Mr. Yasuo Fukuda, Prime Minister of Japan at the 
Opening Session of the Fourth Tokyo International Conference on African Devel-
opment (TICAD IV). May 28, online: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/ti-
cad/ticad4/pm/address.html, accessed 23.06.2008. 
MOFA (2008e): Joint Missions for promoting trade and investment to Africa. online: 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/trade/index.html, accessed 31.10.2008. 
MOFA (2008f): ODA yosan [ODA budget]. online: http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/ 
gaiko/oda/shiryo/yosan.html, accessed 31.10.2008. 
MOFA (2008g): Japan’s efforts towards the achievement of the Millennium Development 
Goals. September 2008, Online: http://www.g8summit.go.jp/doc/pdf/ 
20080929_02.pdf,  accessed 04.11. 2008. 
Nihon Keizai Shinbun (2008a): Nihon, Afurika jûshi zenmen ni, jôninri, shiryô kakuho ni-
ramu [Japan to promote greater importance of Africa, eying for a permanent seat of 
the U.N. Security Council and securing resources]. 08 July 2008, p. 2. 
Nihon Keizai Shinbun (2008b): 10gatsu, ugokidasu shin-taisei – JICA [new structure set in 
motion in October – JICA]. 02 October 2008, p. 7. 
NNI (Nikkei Net Interactive) (2008a): Editorial: Aiding Africa Requires Long-Term 
Commitment. 31 May 2008, online: http://www.nikkei.co.jp, accessed 23.06.2008. 
NNI (Nikkei Net Interactive) (2008b): Japan To Send 2 GSDF Officers To Sudan By Late 
October. 27 September 2008, online: http://www.nikkei.co.jp, accessed 29.09.2008. 
Nadine Burgschweiger 
 
428
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) (2008): OECD Fact-
book 2008. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
OECD/DAC (OECD Development Assistance Committee) (2008): ODA by Donor, Interna-
tional Development Statistics. DAC Online Database, online: http://stats.oecd.org/ 
wbos/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=ODA_DONOR, accessed 10.10.2008. 
Pohl, M. (1998): Ein unbekannter Kontinent? Japans Entdeckung Afrikas. In: Pohl, M./ 
Mayer, H.-J. (Hrsg.): Länderbericht Japan. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 
pp. 240-242. 
Takahashi, M. (2008): Opportunity to be seized, responsibility to be shouldered. The Japan 
Times, 28 May 2008, p. 5. 
Terada, S. (2008): Investors looking beyond raw materials to consumers. The Japan Times 
Online, 27 May 2008, online: http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20080527a4. 
html, accessed 06.06.2008. 
The Japan Times (2008a): TICAD IV works to build global development partnership for Af-
rica. 28 May 2008, p. 5. 
The Japan Times (2008b): Connection: Commodities – From coffee to cocoa, cobalt to crude, 
continent feeds Japan’s needs. 28 May 2008, p. 3. 
The Nikkei Weekly (2008a): At conference, Japan shows its readiness to help African na-
tions, 09 June 2008, p. 29. 
The Nikkei Weekly (2008b): Japan firms set sights on Africa. 02 June 2008, p. 1,3. 
UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) (2008): Major FDI In-
dicators (WIR 2008): online: http://stats.unctad.org/FDI/TableViewer/tableView. 
aspx?ReportId=1254, accessed 03.11.2008. 
Watanabe, M. (2008): Japan’s Foreign Aid Policy in Transition: An Interpretation of 
TICAD IV. Japan aktuell – Journal of Current Japanese Affairs 3 (2008): pp. 7-26. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Nadine Burgschweiger (M.A.), Japanese Studies, Law and Economics at the University of 
Hamburg. Since 2006: PhD student at the GIGA Institute of Asian Studies, 2007: Postgradu-
ate Grant student at the German Institute for Japanese Studies in Tokyo. Since 2008 Re-
search Fellow at the GIGA Institute of Asian Studies; responsibilities: Japan’s economy. 
